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CALIFORNIA’S CHILD ABUSE DEPENDENCY 
HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN IN RE I.C. 
Rachel Monas* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Juvenile dependency courts have the difficult task of deciding 
when children must be separated from their parents to protect them 
from abuse or neglect.1 When faced with a close case, the court 
balances two grave risks: that it might separate an innocent parent 
from their2 child and needlessly traumatize both parties or that the 
court might dismiss a true claim of abuse and fail to protect the child 
from further harm.3 
The dependency court’s task is particularly formidable in sexual 
abuse cases, where the allegations are grave but frequently 
uncorroborated.4 There are many reasons for this: child sexual abuse 
happens in secret, and often leaves no mark.5 Children who previously 
told a family member or social worker that their parent abused them 
may refuse to testify in court out of fear6 or may be unable to testify 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Art History, Wesleyan 
University, 2007.  
 1. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2016). At a jurisdictional hearing, if the 
dependency court finds proof by a preponderance of evidence that a child has been abused by their 
parent, or the child otherwise comes within the meaning of section 300, the court may exercise its 
jurisdiction over the child and deem the child a dependent of the court. Id. §§ 300, 355. 
 2. This Comment uses the singular gender-neutral pronoun “they” in recognition of 
nonbinary gender expressions. See Stan Sarkisov & Carleigh Kude, Pronoun Power: The Standard 
for Gender Neutrality, S.F. ATT’Y, Winter 2017, at 42. 
 3. In re I.C. (In re I.C. I), 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 129 (Ct. App. 2015) (Stewart, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (“With the exception of death penalty cases, it is hard to imagine an area of the law 
where there is a greater need for reliable findings by the trier of fact [than child sexual abuse 
dependency cases]. The consequences of being wrong—on either side—are too great.” (citing 
Blanca P. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 697 (Ct. App. 1996))), rev’d, 415 P.3d 773 (Cal. 
2018); see In re I.C. (In re I.C. II), 415 P.3d 773, 788 (Cal. 2018). 
 4. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 781 (“[T]here are particular difficulties with proving child 
sexual abuse: the frequent lack of physical evidence, the limited verbal and cognitive abilities of 
child victims, the fact that children are often unable or unwilling to act as witnesses because of the 
intimidation of the courtroom setting and the reluctance to testify against their parents.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. In re Carmen O., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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because they are too young to understand the duty to tell the truth (so-
called “truth-incompetent children”).7 In many cases, a child’s prior 
statements to family members or social workers will be the strongest 
evidence that the child was sexually abused.8 
Although out-of-court statements like these are typically 
inadmissible at trial as unreliable hearsay,9 California’s courts and 
legislature have recognized that the challenges of child sexual abuse 
cases necessitate an exception for hearsay in dependency 
proceedings.10 The child dependency hearsay exception allows 
juvenile courts to base a finding of abuse solely upon a very young 
child’s uncorroborated hearsay statements, so long as the statements 
bear special indicia of reliability.11 
The special indicia of reliability test is intended to neutralize the 
risk of making an incorrect finding of abuse based on false hearsay 
statements—a risk that is heightened when the child is too young to 
differentiate between truth and lies.12 Such was the case in In re I.C.,13 
where the California Supreme Court reversed a dependency court’s 
judgment that had removed a father from his family’s home based 
solely upon his daughter’s hearsay statements.14 The three-year-old 
child, I.C.,15 was videotaped in a forensic interview telling stories that 
interwove graphic descriptions of being sexually abused by her father 
 
 7. See, e.g., In re Basilio T., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 450, 457 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 8. See, e.g., In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 773; In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1026 (Cal. 2000) 
(plurality opinion). 
 9. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 780 (“As a general rule, an out-of-court statement offered for the 
truth of its content is inadmissible in evidence. This rule, which is ‘of venerable common law 
pedigree,’ is rooted in concerns about reliability. Unlike in-court testimony, hearsay statements 
generally are not made under oath; they are generally made outside of the view of the trier of fact, 
which therefore cannot adequately assess the speaker’s credibility; and they are not generally 
subject to testing through cross-examination.”). 
 10. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West 2016) (providing that all relevant evidence, 
including hearsay, is admissible in a child dependency adjudication); In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 
1037 (“[I]f a parent abuses a particularly young child in private and leaves no physical marks, two 
common scenarios, the child cannot be protected if the trial court does not consider and act on his 
or her hearsay statements.”). 
 11. Indicia of reliability, or “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” are those qualities 
of a statement’s content or circumstances that tend to indicate that the statement is true and reliable. 
See In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340, 1352 (Cal. 1997). 
 12. In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1031–32. 
 13. 415 P.3d 773 (Cal. 2018). 
 14. Id. at 788. 
 15. Because the minor’s name is confidential, she is referred to by her initials in the court 
opinions and in this Comment. 
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with nonsensical, obvious falsehoods.16 I.C. had recently been 
molested by an eight-year-old neighbor boy, and many of her 
statements about her father included details that echoed the events 
surrounding her prior sexual abuse.17 
Although the dependency court acknowledged that some of I.C.’s 
statements were “very unclear, and at times very confusing,” the court 
decided that her “core allegations” bore sufficient indicia of reliability 
to support a finding of abuse.18 Two justices on the three-judge panel 
for the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.19 The third, Justice 
Stewart, dissented, arguing that her colleagues were incorrect to 
“reflexively defer[]” to the dependency court’s decision, which in her 
view was not supported by substantial evidence.20 The California 
Supreme Court agreed with Justice Stewart and unanimously reversed 
the dependency court’s judgment.21 
In re I.C. is the first California Supreme Court case in nearly 
twenty years to address the correct application of the child hearsay 
exception in dependency proceedings.22 This Comment considers the 
implications of the supreme court’s holding in In re I.C., both for 
dependency courts evaluating children’s hearsay statements and 
appellate courts reviewing those evaluations. 
Parts II and III examine the unusual circumstances of In re I.C. 
and the reasoning behind the supreme court’s decision. Next, Part IV 
considers how the child dependency hearsay exception evolved in its 
social and legal contexts. Finally, Part V analyzes the impact that the 
decision will have on future courts, including ambiguities and open 
questions that remain about the child dependency hearsay exception 
following In re I.C. 
 
 16. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 776–77. 
 17. Id. at 787; In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 129–31 (Ct. App. 2015) (Stewart, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
 18. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118, 120. 
 19. See id. at 111 (majority opinion), 127 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 20. Id. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 21. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 773–74. 
 22. See id.; In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion). 
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  I.C.’s Prior Sexual Abuse and Subsequent Statements 
About Her Father 
As she was being tucked into bed one evening in September 2012, 
three-year-old I.C. told her mother, “Daddy put his penis on me.”23 
I.C.’s mother was alarmed by I.C.’s statement, but hesitated to take it 
at face value.24 Sexual abuse and body parts had become a normal 
topic of discussion in their household.25 
Two months earlier, in July, I.C. had been molested by an eight-
year-old boy from the neighborhood named Oscar.26 Oscar, I.C., and 
Julian (I.C.’s five-year-old brother) were together on Julian’s bed 
when I.C.’s mother found them.27 The children separated suddenly, 
and Oscar admitted that he had been kissing I.C. on the mouth.28 I.C. 
said that Oscar undressed her, removing her “shoes[,] socks, pants, and 
underwear,” and that Oscar “then inserted a wooden train into her 
vagina.”29 Child Protective Services and the police were both 
notified.30 
Over the next two months, I.C. had many conversations with her 
family about what Oscar did to I.C., the difference between “good” 
and “bad” touches, and bodily autonomy: that no one is allowed to 
touch her body without their permission, and that it is not okay for 
anyone to hurt her.31 
In early September, I.C. saw Oscar for the first time since he 
molested her while I.C. and her mother were dropping off Julian on 
his first day of school.32 I.C. was scared and confused to see that Oscar 
attended the same school as her brother.33 That Friday, Julian told I.C. 
and their mother that Oscar had bullied him at school, and I.C.’s 
 
 23. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 131. 
 24. Id. at 130, 132. 
 25. Id. at 129–31. 
 26. Id. at 129–30. 
 27. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 775. 
 28. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae California Appellate Defense Counsel in Support of Appellant 
Alberto C. at 13–14, In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d 773 (Cal. 2018) (No. S229276), 2016 WL 942885 
[hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae]. 
 33. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 776. 
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mother called the principal.34 All weekend long, the family talked 
about Oscar.35 
A couple of days later, a Tuesday evening, I.C. told her mother, 
“My dad put his penis on me.”36 Julian heard I.C. and told her, “No, 
that’s what Oscar did to you.”37 Like Julian, I.C.’s mother assumed 
that I.C. was thinking about Oscar.38 I.C.’s mother was worried, but 
she was unable to get clear details from I.C.39 
The next morning was a Wednesday, and I.C. usually would have 
stayed home with her father instead of going to preschool (like she did 
on Tuesdays and Thursdays).40 However, I.C.’s mother, still confused 
about why I.C. had said what she said, decided in an abundance of 
caution to take I.C. to preschool instead of leaving her alone with her 
father.41 I.C.’s mother woke I.C.’s father to tell him that she was taking 
I.C. to school, and she told him what I.C. had said the previous 
evening.42 “That’s crazy,” he replied.43 
That morning at preschool, I.C. told her teachers, “Dad put his 
penis on me.”44 Police were notified, and I.C. was brought to the Child 
Abuse Listening, Interviewing and Coordination (CALICO) Center 
for a forensic interview.45 At the outset of the CALICO interview, I.C. 
promised not to lie and then made several statements about what she 
had done that morning that were untrue (she said she went to San 
Francisco with her mother and to the park with her father, went 
shopping, bought eggs and glasses, watched a movie, and more).46 I.C. 
was then asked what she had told her teachers at school.47 I.C. 
answered: 
“I told daddy put penis on me,” adding, “then he put a train 
on me and he put a flower on me yesterday.” Pointing to the 
mat next to her [at the CALICO Center], she said, “In this 
 
 34. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 131; Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 32, at 14. 
 35. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 131; Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 32, at 14. 
 36. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 131. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 130. 
 39. Id. at 131–32. 
 40. Id. at 132. 
 41. Id. at 123 n.8, 132. 
 42. Id. at 132. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 130, 132. 
 46. Id. at 132; In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d 773, 776 (Cal. 2018). 
 47. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 776. 
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bed,” but then said they were on [Julian]’s bed. I.C. climbed 
on the mat, lay down and opened her legs and, gesturing 
towards her groin area, said “he do this to my vagina.” When 
asked again what Father had done, I.C. repeated: “Put a penis 
and then a flower and then the train.” The interviewer asked 
what I.C. was wearing. I.C. said: “I don’t wear clothes . . . he 
take off my clothes. He take off my shoes, my pants and my 
shirt . . . . My underwear too . . . and my socks.” 
I.C. said Father then kissed her on her mouth and she 
said, “stop it,” adding: “And he didn’t listen to me when I 
say ‘stop it.’” When asked why she wanted Father to stop, 
I.C. said, “because he can’t do that to touch me here,” putting 
her hand on her groin area . . . . “Don’t do that. Okay. 
That’s . . . mine. If he leaves my vagina alone, just leave 
it.” . . . 
. . . I.C. demonstrated that Father “put penis on me like 
this,” touching her vagina, and “then like that,” poking 
between her legs with her fingers two times, adding “he put 
penis on me and he do this, this, this, this,” poking with her 
hand each time . . . . 
Asked if a penis is the same thing as a train, she said, 
“Yeah.” . . . 
I.C. said when Mother returned home, she told Mother 
what Father had done and “told her ‘stop it.’” She “said, 
Daddy, stop it, that’s not . . . yours, that’s mine. Anyone can 
touch my vagina.” . . . I.C. stated Mother said, “‘[S]top.’ ‘Oh 
my, daddy is going to be in all so much trouble.’” I.C. said 
Father was going to jail and had told the police, “‘I promise, 
I won’t do it again.’” . . . 
The interviewer asked, “have you ever seen your daddy 
do that to anybody else?” and I.C. answered, “He do that to 
RJ,” Father’s 21-year-old daughter from a previous 
marriage. Asked what she saw Father do, I.C. said: “Put 
penis in the flower and the train and train and . . . that’s it.” 
She added that Father removed RJ’s clothes and removed his 
own clothes and RJ kissed him. I.C. was with them on 
[Julian]’s bed, as well as her babysitter and her babysitter’s 
sister. Asked what Father wanted to do, she said, “the bad 
(10) 53.2_MONAS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  1:09 PM 
2020] CHILD ABUSE DEPENDENCY HEARSAY EXCEPTION 483 
things,” which are “the train, the train and train—and the 
flower and the penis.”48 
Following the CALICO interview, the Alameda County Social 
Services Agency (the “Agency”) filed a petition alleging that I.C.’s 
father, Alberto, had sexually abused I.C. and requesting that she be 
made a dependent of the dependency court.49 
B.  Dependency Court Jurisdictional Hearing 
At the subsequent jurisdictional hearing,50 the dependency court 
observed that “essentially, all the Court has to go on in this case is the 
hearsay statements of a three-year-old minor.”51 Under the child 
hearsay exception, as the court understood it, “if the Court finds that 
the time, content and the circumstances” of the statements “have some 
indicia of reliability,” then the uncorroborated statements would be 
sufficient to support a finding that Alberto abused I.C. (and the court 
could exercise dependency jurisdiction).52 The dependency court 
considered the factors bearing upon reliability that the California 
Supreme Court set forth in In re Cindy L.53 and In re Lucero L.,54 
including: whether I.C. made the statements spontaneously, whether 
I.C.’s statements remained consistent, whether she was prompted by 
adults to answer a certain way, and whether she had any motive to 
lie.55 
Considering these factors, the dependency court found “evidence 
that supports [the] reliability” of I.C.’s statements, as well as 
“evidence that supports a conclusion that her statements are 
unreliable.”56 First, the court found the hearsay statements were 
reliable because: I.C.’s statements to her mother and teachers were 
 
 48. Id. at 776–77. 
 49. Id. at 775. 
 50. At a dependency jurisdictional hearing, if the juvenile court finds proof by a 
preponderance of evidence that a child has been abused by their parent, or the child otherwise 
comes within the meaning of California Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, the court may 
exercise its jurisdiction over the child and deem the child a dependent of the court. CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE §§ 300, 355 (West 2016). 
 51. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118. 
 52. Id. (citing In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 2000); In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340 (Cal. 
1997)). 
 53. 947 P.2d 1340 (Cal. 1997). 
 54. 998 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 2000). 
 55. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118 (citing In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1032); In re Cindy 
L., 947 P.2d at 1353). 
 56. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 119. 
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“completely spontaneous” and “came out of the blue”; I.C. 
“consistently repeated the same core allegations to various people” 
and on the CALICO videotape; I.C. “was not prompted by any adults 
that she talked to”; and she had no motive to lie.57 
On the other hand, the court found the hearsay statements were 
unreliable because: I.C.’s description of being in bed with Alberto, her 
older half-sister, the babysitter, and the babysitter’s sister was “not 
believable”; I.C.’s assertion that Alberto had abused I.C. on the mat at 
the CALICO Center was “not correct”; and I.C. made “very confusing 
statements about the train and the flower . . . . [which] leads one to 
believe that maybe she’s having some sort of flashback to the July 
encounter with the eight-year-old.”58 
Notwithstanding these unreliable aspects, the dependency court 
found there was “no credible evidence” that I.C. had experienced 
“some psychological event . . . leading her to recall the events of July 
and project those events on the father.”59 The court also emphasized 
that there were “several distinctions between the July incident” and 
I.C.’s statements about Alberto.60 For instance, the court noted that 
I.C. used the word “penis” to describe her father’s actions but had not 
used the word in her statements to police after Oscar’s abuse even, 
though the word was part of her vocabulary at that time.61 In addition, 
whereas I.C.’s mother and brother were at home during the July 
incident, I.C. “was very clear” in the video that they were both absent 
when Alberto abused her.62 To the court, these distinctions painted the 
picture of a “very different scenario than the scenario in the July 
incident.”63 
In the end, after comparing the indicia weighing for and against 
reliability, the court found “the evidence that supports the reliability 
more compelling.”64 The dependency court thus sustained the 
Agency’s petition, found that Alberto had sexually abused I.C., and 
ordered that Alberto be removed from the family’s home.65 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 119–20. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 120 & n.5, 126. 
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C.  First District Court of Appeal 
Two years later, a splintered panel of the First District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the dependency court’s decision.66 Alberto had asked 
the court of appeal to review “whether [I.C.’s] statements by 
themselves reached the level of substantial evidence”—in other 
words, whether the statements bore special indicia of reliability under 
Lucero L., such that they could support a jurisdictional finding without 
corroboration.67 However, in the majority’s view, what Alberto was 
asking was beyond the scope of appellate review.68 
According to the majority, when the dependency court reviewed 
the videotaped CALICO interview and drew conclusions from 
watching I.C. speak and gesture, it “was exercising its power to judge 
credibility,” which the appellate court could not usurp.69 To avoid 
overriding the dependency court’s credibility determinations, the 
majority reasoned, the issue was “not whether [the appellate court] 
think[s] I.C.’s statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy 
Lucero, but whether substantial evidence supports the dependency 
court’s finding that they did.”70 The majority held that substantial 
evidence did support the dependency court’s finding that I.C.’s 
statements were sufficiently reliable and applauded the lower court for 
“the scrupulousness with which [it] evaluated the pros and cons of the 
hearsay statements.”71 
In a vehement dissent, Justice Stewart declared that the majority’s 
“reflexive affirmance of the dependency court’s erroneous decision” 
was “a grave injustice.”72 According to Justice Stewart, the 
dependency court had applied its own “more-reliable-than-not 
standard,” and I.C.’s statements did not reach Lucero L.’s special 
indicia of reliability test.73 Moreover, Justice Stewart pointed to 
language in Lucero L. stating that a court “may rely exclusively on [a 
truth-incompetent child’s] out-of-court statements only ‘if the 
declarant’s truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances 
 
 66. Id. at 124. 
 67. Id. at 123. 
 68. See id. at 123–24. 
 69. Id. at 111, 117 (quoting In re I.J., 299 P.3d 1254, 1258 (Cal. 2013)) (“[I]ssues of fact and 
credibility are the province of the trial court.”). 
 70. Id. at 124. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 129 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 141. 
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that the test of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.’”74 
According to Justice Stewart, the court thus had a “responsibility 
under Lucero L. to review the record for substantial evidence of I.C.’s 
clear truthfulness,” which it had not done.75 
Soon after, the California Supreme Court granted review.76 
III.  REASONING OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
A.  No Clear Truthfulness Standard 
In a unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court in In re 
I.C. first addressed whether Lucero L. requires showing the child 
declarant’s clear truthfulness when relying on the uncorroborated 
hearsay of a truth-incompetent child, as Justice Stewart had argued.77 
The supreme court held that Lucero L. did not require this higher 
standard,78 explaining that the Lucero L. opinion had only 
“borrowed”79 the language in question from Idaho v. Wright,80 a 
United States Supreme Court case that created a hearsay exception for 
statements by truth-incompetent children in the criminal context.81 
According to the supreme court in In re I.C., the Court in Wright had 
used the clear truthfulness language simply to illustrate the underlying 
rationale for permitting exceptions, but it did not actually adopt a clear 
truthfulness requirement for the child hearsay exception.82 Instead, 
Wright created an indicia of reliability test, which included a non-
exhaustive list of factors that tend to show that a statement is 
trustworthy.83 
Because Lucero L. adopted a similar “indicia of reliability” 
requirement to the one in Wright, with similar factors, the supreme 
court in In re I.C. reasoned that the clear truthfulness language in 
Lucero L. did not impose a clear truthfulness requirement in 
dependency cases, just as the original language in Wright did not 
 
 74. In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1034 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion). 
 75. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127 (citing In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1034). 
 76. In re I.C., 358 P.3d 1282 (Cal. 2015) (granting review). 
 77. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d 773, 783 (Cal. 2018); In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 127. 
 78. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 783–84. 
 79. Id. at 783. 
 80. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 81. Id. at 820; see In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 783. 
 82. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 784. 
 83. Id. (citing Wright, 497 U.S. at 822). 
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impose the standard in criminal cases.84 The court in In re I.C. 
confirmed that the special indicia of reliability test continues to govern 
the child hearsay exception for dependency proceedings.85 
B.  Substantial Evidence Standard of Review 
The supreme court next asked whether substantial evidence 
supported the dependency court’s decision to rely solely on I.C.’s 
uncorroborated hearsay statements.86 The supreme court disagreed 
with the court of appeal’s majority, which held that reviewing courts 
should defer to a lower court if it has at least some basis for finding 
indicia of reliability.87 Rather, the supreme court considered whether 
the record as a whole contained substantial evidence showing that 
I.C.’s hearsay statements had special indicia of reliability.88 The court 
found it did not and reversed the judgment.89 
The court found that I.C.’s statements did not bear special indicia 
of reliability because the dependency court had “failed to take 
adequate account of the confounding role of I.C.’s prior molestation” 
when it considered the reliability factors (e.g., spontaneity, 
consistency, prompting, and motive to lie).90 I.C.’s statements were 
not spontaneous, the supreme court reasoned, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances: I.C. was molested by Oscar two months 
prior, I.C. saw Oscar at Julian’s school just days earlier, and the family 
had frequent talks about “bad touches” and private parts.91 Likewise, 
the consistency of I.C.’s “core allegations” (namely that Alberto 
touched her with his penis) was “not particularly strong” when 
considered alongside I.C.’s other nonsensical statements about her 
father and trains or flowers, which the dependency court admitted 
were confusing.92 
In addition, the court disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion 
that there were clear distinctions between the incident with Oscar and 
 
 84. Id. (citing In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1034 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion)). 
 85. Id. at 774 (citing In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1032). 
 86. Id. at 785–86. Part V of this Comment discusses the court’s adoption of a substantial 
evidence review standard and the open question the court left by doing so. See infra Part V. 
 87. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 779, 785. 
 88. See id. at 787–88. 
 89. Id. at 786. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 776, 786. 
 92. Id. 
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the one I.C. described with her father.93 I.C.’s mother testified that she 
had used the word “penis” in her discussions with I.C., so I.C.’s use 
of that word in connection with Alberto did not indicate that she must 
have been referring to an entirely different situation.94 Moreover, I.C. 
“did not clearly communicate” that she was home alone with Alberto 
during the alleged abuse her because she had also said at one point that 
her mother had been home but sleeping.95 Finally, the court noted that 
many of I.C.’s stories showed she “had a tendency to interweave 
fantasy with truth,” which was “relevant in evaluating whether I.C. 
was likely telling the truth about the incidents involving [Alberto].”96 
The court also found that the appellate court had erred by 
deferring so strongly to the dependency court’s determination of I.C.’s 
credibility based on the videotaped CALICO interview.97 All parties 
agreed that many of the statements that I.C. made on the video were 
confusing, contradictory, or plainly untrue.98 The court noted that any 
additional credibility the dependency court may have afforded I.C.’s 
statements based on reviewing the video was likely the result of 
watching I.C.’s sexually graphic hand gestures.99 However, the court 
stated that “given I.C.’s prior sexual molestation, we cannot conclude 
that the degree of sexual knowledge demonstrated by her gestures is 
an accurate indicator of the reliability of her allegations involving 
[Alberto].”100 The court concluded that “[t]he videotape, in short, 
cannot close the substantial gap between the indications of I.C.’s 
unreliability and the dependency court’s finding that I.C.’s account 
was sufficiently reliable to support a jurisdictional finding.”101 
The supreme court thus found that, in light of the whole 
evidentiary record, there was not substantial evidence to support the 
dependency court’s determination that I.C.’s statements bore special 
indicia of reliability.102 Accordingly, I.C.’s uncorroborated statements 
were insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that Alberto 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 786–87. 
 97. Id. at 787. 
 98. Id. at 785, 788. 
 99. Id. at 787. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 788. 
 102. Id. 
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sexually abused I.C. and its ensuing exercise of dependency 
jurisdiction over I.C.103 The supreme court reversed.104 
IV.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CHILD DEPENDENCY 
HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
For the better part of the twentieth century, child sexual abuse was 
not discussed in the public forum, or if it was, its traumatic impact was 
minimized.105 This changed dramatically in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, as social attitudes towards child abuse began to 
change and the public became increasingly aware of the effects that 
abuse during childhood, particularly sexual abuse, can have on its 
victims.106 State social services agencies across the country expanded 
after Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
(CAPTA) in 1974,107 and the number of reports of alleged child 
abuse—many of them unfounded—rose dramatically in ensuing 
years.108 
In the mid-1980s, public hysteria about “epidemic” child 
molestation reached a fever pitch as several highly publicized cases of 
alleged child sexual abuse gripped the nation’s attention.109 The 
allegations in these cases were shocking and outrageous, and there was 
a public outcry for justice and an outpouring of concern for victims.110 
A movement developed to expand evidentiary exceptions for hearsay 
in child abuse trials so that young victims’ statements could be 
considered in court without requiring them to testify and incur 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See MARK PENDERGRAST, THE REPRESSED MEMORY EPIDEMIC: HOW IT HAPPENED AND 
WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN FROM IT 2–3 (2017) (ebook). 
 106. Kathleen Coulborn Faller, Forty Years of Forensic Interviewing of Children Suspected of 
Sexual Abuse, 1974–2014: Historical Benchmarks, 4 SOC. SCI. 34, 34–35 (2015); Stephen M. 
Krason, The Mondale Act and Its Aftermath: An Overview of Forty Years of American Law, Public 
Policy, and Governmental Response to Child Abuse and Neglect, in CHILD ABUSE, FAMILY 
RIGHTS, AND THE CHILD PROTECTIVE SYSTEM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FROM LAW, ETHICS, AND 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 1, 6–7 (Stephen M. Krason ed., 2013). 
 107. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974). 
 108. Krason, supra note 106, at 7–8 (“In 1963, at the time that the first generation of (limited) 
reporting laws were being put into place, there were 150,000 reports of abuse and neglect 
nationwide. . . . In 1984, ten years after passage, the number had climbed to 1.5 million.”). 
 109. RICHARD BECK, WE BELIEVE THE CHILDREN: A MORAL PANIC IN THE 1980S, xiii, 115–
16 (2015). 
 110. Id. at 116–17. 
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additional trauma.111 State legislatures began to pass hearsay 
exceptions for cases of child sexual abuse, frequently allowing for 
social workers’ reports and the statements contained therein to be 
admitted.112 
California’s child abuse hearsay exception for dependency 
proceedings began to evolve in this social environment of growing 
concern about child sexual abuse. Despite the mounting social 
attention on child abuse cases in the mid-1980s, California courts 
declined to create any general reliability exceptions or other special 
evidentiary rules for child hearsay statements in sexual abuse 
dependency cases.113 However, in 1990, the supreme court changed 
course in In re Malinda S.,114 which found that children’s hearsay 
statements contained in social studies (i.e., social services reports) 
counted as “legally admissible” evidence under section 355 of the 
California Welfare and Institutions Code, and dependency courts 
could therefore admit and rely upon those statements to sustain a 
jurisdictional finding.115 
The child dependency hearsay exception continued to expand 
throughout the 1990s. Not only could prosecuting child protective 
agencies submit any out-of-court statements into evidence following 
Malinda S. (as long as they wrote them down in the social study 
first),116 by 1994 the courts had created a general reliability exception 
in dependency courts for any child’s hearsay statements (whether 
 
 111. Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases, 
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2122–23 (1996). 
 112. See Jean L. Kelly, Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay 
Exception and the Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (1985). 
 113. See, e.g., In re Donald R., 240 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Ct. App. 1987); In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 789, 807 (Ct. App. 1984) (declining to follow the example of the state of Wisconsin, which 
had created a “residual exception” test that permitted admission of a child’s out-of-court statements 
that bore indicia of reliability). At that time, courts could admit a child’s hearsay statement in a 
dependency proceeding only if fit under an existing hearsay exception, such as a “spontaneous 
exclamation.” In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. at 809–10. Under the “spontaneous exclamation” or 
“excited utterance” hearsay exception, the statement may be admitted to prove the truth it asserts 
so long as the statement was made soon after (e.g., less than five minutes) the relevant event (e.g., 
the sexual abuse), such that the declarant was still “under the stress of the excitement” of the event. 
Id. 
 114. 795 P.2d 1244 (Cal. 1990). 
 115. Id. at 1244–45. 
 116. Id. 
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contained in a social study or not).117 In In re Carmen O.,118 the court 
of appeal concluded that a broad child dependency hearsay exception 
was necessary because “there are particular difficulties with proving 
child sexual abuse,”119 and “the typical dependency case often reveals 
statements of child victims which seem under the circumstances to be 
reliable” and which the dependency courts “should be entitled to 
consider.”120 In 1996, California’s legislature amended section 355 in 
part to legitimize both of these hearsay exceptions.121 
However, as the child dependency hearsay exception expanded in 
the 1990s, the social tide was turning as the public grew increasingly 
skeptical of children making sexual abuse accusations. Whereas 
public support for believing child victims of sexual abuse had been 
very strong during the mid-1980s child molestation “epidemic” (even 
when victims’ stories were quite bizarre),122 several of the children 
involved in high-profile cases recanted their accusations and many of 
the publicized cases were dropped or overturned on appeal.123 Fresh 
concerns emerged about social workers using suggestive or coercive 
interviewing techniques, which had previously been the professional 
norm but were shown to implant false memories in children.124 
Similarly, as California courts honed the newly adopted child 
dependency hearsay exception in the mid-1990s, the emphasis shifted 
to ensuring the reliability of hearsay out of concern for parents’ due 
 
 117. See In re Carmen O., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 851–55 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that an 
appellate court like itself could validly create what it called a “child dependency hearsay exception” 
to encompass a child’s out-of-court statements, even if not contained in social studies, but failing 
to specify any test for reliability). 
 118. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 119. In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340, 1348–49 (Cal. 1997) (for example, “the frequent lack of 
physical evidence, the limited verbal and cognitive abilities of child victims, the fact that children 
are often unable or unwilling to act as witnesses because of the intimidation of the courtroom setting 
and the reluctance to testify against their parents”). 
 120. In re Carmen O., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852. 
 121. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355(a)–(c) (West 1996) (amended 2014); In re Lucero 
L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1028 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion). 
 122. E.g., BECK, supra note 109, at xi–xii (describing the allegations in the famous McMartin 
case, which made headlines in 1983 after social workers interviewed dozens of children from the 
same daycare in Los Angeles and concluded that the daycare owners had sexually abused at least 
sixty children in their care, exploited the children for pornography, and forced the children to watch 
animals be mutilated and killed, and quoting the statement of the mother of one of the alleged 
victims: “[T]here was no doubt in her mind ‘or in anybody else’s mind’ that her son had been 
abused. ‘You cannot—he cannot—have made any of this up. There is no way.’”). 
 123. Anderson, supra note 111, at 2117–18. 
 124. Faller, supra note 106, at 35. 
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process rights.125 In Cindy L., the supreme court held that a child’s 
non-social study hearsay statements will only be admissible under 
Carmen O. if the statements have sufficient indicia of reliability 
pursuant to several factors like timing, content, and surrounding 
circumstances, and only if the child declarant is available to testify or 
the statements are corroborated by other evidence.126 Importantly, the 
Cindy L. court also found that hearsay statements by a child who could 
not distinguish between the truth and lies are not categorically barred 
as unreliable.127 Instead, a child’s so-called truth-incompetence is 
another factor relevant in the indicia of reliability test, and the hearsay 
is admissible so long as it is corroborated.128 
Finally, in 2000, the supreme court in Lucero L. added yet another 
wrinkle to the child dependency hearsay exception.129 Whereas many 
of the cases up to that point had been concerned with the admissibility 
of children’s hearsay evidence, Lucero L. was primarily concerned 
with the substantiality of that evidence.130 In Lucero L., the juvenile 
court in a dependency jurisdictional proceeding relied solely upon 
hearsay statements contained in a social worker’s report that were 
made by a truth-incompetent, three-year-old child, even though the 
hearsay statements were not corroborated by other evidence, in finding 
that Lucero’s father had molested her.131 The appellate court affirmed, 
finding that section 355, subsection (c)(1)(B) of the California Welfare 
and Institutions Code provides that a young child’s hearsay statement 
that is contained in a social study constitutes substantial evidence and 
is sufficient alone to support a jurisdictional finding (i.e., without 
corroboration), unless “the statement is unreliable because it was the 
product of fraud, deceit, or undue influence” (which the dependency 
court did not find).132 
 
 125. See, e.g., In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1031–35 (plurality opinion); In re Cindy L., 947 
P.2d 1340, 1348–49 (Cal. 1997). 
 126. In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d at 1349. 
 127. Id. at 1353. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1033 (creating the special indicia of reliability test for 
truth-incompetent minors’ uncorroborated hearsay statements in dependency proceedings). 
 130. See id. at 1031 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregory v. State Bd. of Control, 86 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 575, 582 (Ct. App. 1999)) (“The admissibility and substantiality of hearsay evidence are 
different issues.”). 
 131. See id. at 1021, 1023, 1025, 1036. 
 132. Id. at 1025–26. 
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In a plurality opinion, the Lucero L. supreme court found that “a 
serious due process problem is raised by permitting . . . sole reliance 
on [a truth-incompetent minor’s hearsay] statements without any 
particular indications of the statements’ reliability.”133 Borrowing the 
reliability test from Cindy L., the court held that a very young child’s 
hearsay statement does not constitute substantial evidence, and is thus 
insufficient alone to support a dependency jurisdictional finding, 
unless the court finds that the hearsay evidence “bears special indicia 
of reliability.”134 Courts should consider whether a statement has 
special indicia of reliability in light of a “nonexhaustive list of factors” 
that tend to show that a statement is more or less trustworthy, 
including: whether the statement was spontaneous, rather than 
prompted by adults; whether the child consistently repeated the 
statement; the child’s mental state at the time of speaking; whether the 
child used precocious sexual language or gestures, versus age-
appropriate terminology; whether the child had motive to lie; whether 
the child can distinguish between truth and falsehoods (truth-
competence); and more—“any factor bearing on reliability may be 
considered.”135 
The next time the supreme court would address the child 
dependency hearsay exception, nearly twenty years after the holding 
of Lucero L., was in 2018 in In re I.C.136 
V.  ANALYSIS 
While the supreme court clarified that special indicia of reliability 
are still required under the exception, the court left ambiguous how a 
dependency court determines what is “special” and how much courts 
of appeal should intrude upon that determination on review.137 
Moreover, the supreme court may have created some ambiguity about 
the impact of a child’s prior sexual abuse on the reliability 
determination. 
 
 133. Id. at 1031; see In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d 773, 782 (Cal. 2018) (In the Lucero L. plurality’s 
view, “‘relying too heavily on the hearsay statements of incompetent minors to make jurisdictional 
findings when there has been no opportunity for cross-examining the minor’—and, in particular, 
when the minor ‘has been determined to be incompetent to distinguish between truth and 
falsehood’—raises a substantial risk of erroneously depriving parents of their substantial interest in 
maintaining custody of their children.” (citations omitted)). 
 134. In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1032. 
 135. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 785. 
 136. See id. at 773. 
 137. Id. at 782–83, 785, 785 n.7. 
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A.  Reliability Standard: What Is “Special”? 
The California Supreme Court’s holding in In re I.C. confirmed 
that the test governing the substantiality of truth-incompetent 
children’s uncorroborated hearsay statements asks whether the 
statements have special indicia of reliability.138 However, the court 
missed an opportunity to provide guidance to lower courts about what 
rises to the level of “special” reliability.139 One of the difficulties with 
the special indicia of reliability test is that different courts can perceive 
that the same circumstances offer different levels of reliability, as the 
dependency and supreme courts did here.140 Thus, additional 
clarification would have been useful here.141 
Although the supreme court in In re I.C. does not explicitly state 
what constitutes “special” indicia of reliability, we can infer some 
limits from its analysis. For one, the supreme court explicitly held that 
special reliability does not require a showing of “clear truthfulness.”142 
According to the supreme court, the “reliability requirement is not 
designed to be ‘especially formidable,’ or to be ‘so stringent’ that ‘it 
will impede the government’s ability to protect children in an abusive 
situation.’”143 In rejecting Justice Stewart’s proposed “clear 
truthfulness,” standard, the court established that the upper boundary 
of special reliability falls somewhere below requiring that a court 
show the child’s hearsay statement was “clearly truthful.”144 
The lower boundary—that is, what is not sufficient to constitute 
“special” indicia—is more challenging to define. For one, confusing 
statements most likely fall below the required level of “special” 
reliability. The In re I.C. court placed importance on the fact that the 
dependency court had acknowledged that I.C.’s statements were 
“confusing about the train and the flower as it relates to the father” but 
 
 138. Id. at 783. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (“Reliability is an 
amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. . . . Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends 
heavily on which [reliability] factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords each of 
them.”). 
 141. Furthermore, the supreme court has not yet addressed whether the word “special” has any 
significance to the child dependency hearsay analysis. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 773, 774, 782–
83, 785, 787–88; In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1022, 1032–33 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion); 
In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340, 1353 (Cal. 1997). 
 142. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 783–84; see supra Part III(A). 
 143. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 784 (quoting In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1033). 
 144. Id.; see In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 144 (Ct. App. 2015) (Stewart, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
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nevertheless found sufficient indicia of reliability.145 In the supreme 
court’s view, the dependency court “failed to take adequate account of 
the confounding role of I.C.’s prior molestation.”146 Because the 
inquiry is about ensuring trustworthy, reliable evidence, statements 
that are confusing probably do not ever rise to the level of “special” 
reliability.147 
For another, In re I.C. may stand for the proposition that it is not 
enough for indicia of reliability to outweigh indicia of unreliability.148 
Here, the dependency court found that “the evidence that supports 
reliability [is] more compelling” than the evidence showing that I.C.’s 
statements were unreliable.149 By overturning the dependency court’s 
decision, the supreme court implied that this “more-reliable-than-not 
standard”150 (as Justice Stewart put it in her dissent from the court of 
appeal) is insufficient.151 
B.  Standard of Review: Effectively Independent 
The supreme court in In re I.C. left an open question regarding 
the standard of review applicable to lower courts’ reliability 
determinations under the child dependency hearsay exception.152 
Because the Lucero L. plurality applied substantial evidence review in 
its analysis, the court in In re I.C. “proceed[ed] on that assumption as 
well.”153 However, the decision to apply substantial evidence review 
in Lucero L. was not supported by a majority of the supreme court.154 
Moreover, although the supreme court in In re I.C. stated that it was 
reviewing the dependency court’s decision for substantial evidence, 
the review it actually applied suggests that a more independent 
standard of review is appropriate.155 
The substantial evidence review standard is deferential to the 
lower court, whose decision, “if correct, will be upheld even if the 
 
 145. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 774, 778, 785–86. 
 146. Id. at 786 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at 781. 
 148. In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 119 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. at 140 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 141. 
 151. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 774. 
 152. See id. at 785 n.7. 
 153. Id. at 785. 
 154. Id. at 785 n.7. 
 155. Id. at 785. 
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stated reasons for the decision are erroneous or incomplete.”156 Under 
substantial evidence review in In re I.C., “the evidence supporting the 
jurisdictional finding must be considered ‘in the light of the whole 
record’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that 
is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’”157 
As the diverging supreme court and court of appeal opinions in In 
re I.C. demonstrate, there are particular challenges for appellate courts 
applying substantial evidence review to a dependency court’s special 
indicia of reliability determination.158 One possible source of 
confusion is the overlapping language—both standards may refer to 
“substantial” evidence.159 In the context of the reliability test, if a 
truth-incompetent child’s uncorroborated hearsay statement bears 
special indicia of reliability, then that statement is substantial evidence 
to support the finding alone.160 Thus, an appellate court applying 
substantial evidence review in similar cases will probably only find 
substantial evidence to support the finding if the contested hearsay 
statement does have special indicia of reliability, and vice versa. In 
such cases, there would be no occasion to give the lower court finding 
any deference, because reviewing the test necessarily means 
reviewing the finding in full. 
The supreme court in In re I.C. applied what was, for all intents 
and purposes, an independent review standard.161 The court performed 
what appeared to be an entirely independent reliability inquiry, with 
little to no deference to the dependency court’s findings.162 
Unfortunately, by choosing to assume without deciding the 
appropriate standard of review,163 the supreme court missed an 
opportunity to clarify how much deference appellate courts should 
give lower courts, which can lead to unequal applications of the law.164 
 
 156. In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1034 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion). 
 157. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 785 (quoting People v. Johnson, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 444–45 (Ct. 
App. 1980)). 
 158. See id. at 785; In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 118 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 159. In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d at 1031 (discussing both evidentiary “substantiality” of hearsay 
evidence and “substantial evidence” standard of review). 
 160. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 785. 
 161. See id. at 786–88. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. at 785. 
 164. Compare, e.g., In re Christopher S., No. E030643, 2002 WL 1376243, at *4, *13 (Cal. Ct. 
App. June 26, 2002) (summarizing the dependency court’s finding that statements had indicia of 
reliability in two brief sentences before holding that the court’s determination was supported with 
substantial evidence), with In re J.R., No. B234957, 2012 WL 1664210, at *20–32, (Cal. Ct. App. 
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Moreover, by explicitly adopting a deferential standard of review in 
its opinion and then reviewing independently, the In re I.C. supreme 
court will only add to confusion in appellate courts about 
distinguishing credibility and reliability determinations, like the court 
of appeal likely experienced here.165 
C.  Implications: Possible New Factors 
1.  Prior Sexual Abuse 
The supreme court in In re I.C. may have in effect created a new 
reliability factor under Lucero L.’s “nonexhaustive list”166—namely, 
that a child’s history of prior sexual abuse may have a tendency to 
show that the child’s hearsay statements are not trustworthy.167 In 
some cases, this precedent may increase the likelihood of an accurate 
reliability determination where a child has a history of prior abuse. For 
example, children who have experienced sexual abuse will manifest 
sexual behaviors inappropriate for their age more often than non-
abused peers.168 Because gestures and language showing precocious 
sexual knowledge are typically considered to make a child’s hearsay 
statement more reliable, considering whether the child declarant has 
been previously abused in a different setting would inform the degree 
of trustworthiness a court should place on the child’s sexualized 
behaviors.169 
On the other hand, there is a danger that courts will give too much 
weight to a child having been sexually abused in the past and discredit 
an honest claim. Child victims of sexual abuse are more likely to be 
abused again.170 Thus, future courts reading the opinion in In re I.C. 
may justifiably infer that evidence of a child’s past abuse diminishes 
 
May 14, 2012) (reviewing each indicium of reliability found by the juvenile court, and the specific 
evidence the juvenile court relied upon to determine that there was objective reliability, before 
upholding the jurisdictional finding). 
 165. See In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 121 n.6 (Ct. App. 2015) (evidencing the court’s 
unusual interpretation of the indicia of reliability test and stating that “[t]his court has taken the 
position that ‘[a]ttempting to frame the issues as one of “reliability” is really no more than a 
challenge to witness credibility’” (second alteration in original)). 
 166. In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1027 (Cal. 2000) (plurality opinion). 
 167. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 784–85 (“[A]ny factor bearing on reliability may be 
considered.”). 
 168. Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and 
Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 165–66, 173 (1993). 
 169. See In re I.C. I, 191 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 119. 
 170. See Kendall-Tackett et al., supra note 169, at 173. 
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the reliability of the child’s hearsay statements about current abuse, 
and find the true statements less reliable, particularly if the two 
incidents share any similarities. 
2.  Interweaving Fantasy with Truth 
Another new factor that the supreme court in In re I.C. has 
implied through its holding is the “tendency to interweave fantasy with 
truth.”171 This factor goes beyond the truth-competence factor 
recognized in Cindy L. because it is concerned with more than the 
child’s ability to distinguish truth and fact.172 Here, the In re I.C. 
supreme court considered that I.C. had a “pattern” of making 
fantastical statements, which the court stated was “relevant in 
evaluating whether I.C. was likely telling the truth about the incidents 
involving Father.”173 
This new factor is likely to be relevant to many future courts 
determining the reliability of a truth-incompetent child’s hearsay 
statements. Research shows that young preschool-aged children have 
impressionable memories, and often “purposefully exaggerate or even 
fabricate details” in telling stories rather “than give a precisely 
accurate account.”174 Because the special indicia of reliability test is 
only implicated in cases involving truth-incompetent children, who 
are frequently preschool-aged,175 this factor may be applied in a large 
number of future cases. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In In re I.C., the California Supreme Court revisited the child 
dependency hearsay exception for the first time since it devised the 
special indicia of reliability test nearly twenty years ago.176 The 
supreme court did helpfully clear up the appellant’s question on 
appeal—confirming that clear truthfulness is not the test, just special 
 
 171. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 786–87. 
 172. See In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340, 1353 (Cal. 1997). 
 173. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 787. 
 174. See Gabrielle F. Principe & Erica Schindewolf, Natural Conversations as a Source of False 
Memories in Children: Implications for the Testimony of Young Witnesses 2 (Sept. 1, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3487111/. 
 175. E.g., In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 774; In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1035 (Cal. 2000) 
(plurality opinion). 
 176. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d 773 (Cal. 2018); In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 2000). 
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indicia177—and provided reviewing courts with an example of 
rigorous analysis under this exception. 
But there is a lingering sense underlying this case that the 
supreme court did not really grant review here for the legal questions 
posed. For one thing, the legal issue the supreme court did solve does 
not seem to have been a source of much confusion before the court 
saw fit to set the record straight.178 For another, the supreme court 
sidestepped those complex legal questions that would benefit most 
from the court’s attention.179 It seems plausible that it was the “unusual 
situation”180 of the “C.” family, and righting the wrong that was done 
to them, that drew the unanimous supreme court’s attention to review. 
Some readers who learn about I.C.’s statements, the factual parallels, 
and the circumstances, may feel instinctively that the supreme court 
















 177. See In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 783. 
 178. Only a few unpublished court of appeal decisions even reference “clear truthfulness,” and 
none of those decisions have actually attempted to apply it as a standard. See, e.g., In re Abigail F., 
No. B267549, 2017 WL 587144, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2017); In re M.G., No. B193671, 
2007 WL 2758064, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2007); In re Hannah A., No. A101474, 2004 WL 
1879874, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004); Dawn Z. v. Superior Court, No. B164965, 2003 WL 
21153450, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 20, 2003). One court of appeal did discuss the application of 
the “marginal utility” test to its review, but the court instead applied the indicia of reliability test 
without analyzing whether the statements in question were clearly truthful. In re Isaac D., No. 
A128905, 2012 WL 2133638, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2012). However, because dependency 
proceedings are sealed, it is difficult to ascertain whether there is confusion at the juvenile court 
level regarding the standard. 
 179. See supra Part V. 
 180. In re I.C. II, 415 P.3d at 788. 
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